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History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, Captain Linwood S. Howeth, USN (Retired), 1963, pages 193-203:


United  States Naval  Radio  Prior  to World  War  I


Intrafleet communications had reached a low ebb of satisfactoriness by 1911. The conditions are well described by a letter of Capt. W. F. Fullam, USN, commanding the U.S.S. Mississippi. In this he had observed:
It is my firm belief that simplicity and certainty have never been properly studied in connection with Tactics and Signals in our Navy, and in consequence it is my opinion, that since Admiral Walker's Squadron in 1887-1890, we have not improved one iota as regards Tactical Signal Book or the System of Tactical Signals needed either in time of peace or war. In some respects our system of flag signals is not as good as it was in 1889. Our slowness in these matters is to me incomprehensible and inexcusible. We talk a great deal, drill a great deal, work very zealously and accomplish little or nothing in the few vitally important points that would tell in time of war.
    In the event of hostilities the useless complexity of our Tactical and Signal System could be clearly demonstrated. We have failed to develop or employ the wireless, as a means of signaling . . . The present systems, so far as they relate to battle or preparations for battle should be blown sky-high. It is no exaggeration to say that dynamite is needed for this purpose--now, not a month or a year hence, but now.
    And right here let me say that the one great trouble--the secret of slowness in our Navy, is that officers either have no opinions, or if they have any they are not sufficiently encouraged to speak them out, or they are afraid to do so except in a namby-pamby way. It too often happens that an officer who really proposes to do something is stigmatized as a radical or extremist and his voice is drowned by the self-styled 'solid men' who are quite unmindful of the distinction between solidity and density.
    By the way, what particular individual, bureau or institution in our Navy is supposed to consider and keep our Tactical and Signal System up to date?1
    Concerning the conditions existing in radio communications Hooper, years later, commented:
As for radio discipline at that time--there was none whatsoever. The fact that an operator was able to send a radio message from one ship to another or to a shore station seemed so thrilling to his captain that each one thought his own operator was the "boy wonder" and gave him absolute authority to send whatever he pleased. If the flagship operator was unfriendly with the operator in another ship he would delay him until all the other operators had transmitted their messages. If a ship was fitted with a more powerful transmitter than others the operator would usually deliberately usurp the air to the detriment of all others. There were more personal than official messages and more operator conversation than messages.2


When the time arrived for the autumn target practices in 1911, Craven, Hooper and Maddox were given additional duty orders to observe the practices and to make reports and recommendations to the Navy Department.3
    One objective of the practice was to ascertain to what extent the firing ships could receive tactical and general signals under battle conditions.4 The plan involved the transmission of tactical signals by radio for receipt by the firing ships during the time their main batteries were in action while the ship towing the target attempted to create interference. As a safety precaution the signals were paralleled by flag hoists.
    When the practices commenced, Hooper took station in the flagship radio room to monitor and note discrepancies. To his amazement not a single ship carried out the instructions. Following the firings he went up to the bridge and found that the receiver required there was not installed. Further investigation indicated that none of the ships had made the required installations. The fact was that the instructions on this subject had been passed to the operators. These men did not have the authority or knowledge to handle the situation beyond the actual transmitting and receiving and had not carried out the directive. Sadly, he reported the situation to Craven who invited the admiral's attention to the apparent oversight. The ships were instructed that, on the next day, they would fully comply with all the "Target Practice Instructions," including the chapter pertaining to the use of radio.
    The next morning Hooper, at his monitoring post, found a few ships attempting to carry out the instructions but with little success. In a later investigation it was disclosed that only one division had exercised in this manner prior to the practices.5


In submitting their report to Craven, both Hooper and Maddox, independently, pointed out the obvious lack of supervision of radio afloat and recommended the assignment of a qualified officer to the staff of the fleet commander. Craven concurred in the recommendation and was successful in convincing the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation that something must be done to improve intrafleet radio communications. The billet was established on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Hooper was assigned this duty.6 Concerning Hooper's assignment Maddox wrote:
At the Navy Department I was asked if I knew of an officer of the rank of Lieutenant who possessed the specified qualifications (being reminded that my own rank of Ensign barred my serving on an Admiral's staff) I had recently become acquainted with Lieutenant Hooper . . . I had learned he was interested in radio . . . I suggested that he would be an admirable choice. When I returned to Annapolis from Washington I informed him that his name was under consideration for appointment as Fleet Radio Officer of the Atlantic Fleet, and recall his expressed indignation at the threatened abrupt termination of his first tour of shore duty. However, after being summoned to the Navy Department he apparently was persuaded that this was a golden opportunity, and his appointment immediately followed . . . Due to his genius and continuous association with naval radio since that time, the United States Navy has the most extensive and efficient radio system of any navy in the world today.7
    On his 27th birthday, 16 August 1912, Hooper reported to Rear Adm. Hugo Osterhaus, USN, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, for duty on his staff as Fleet Radio Officer. He quickly discovered that the establishment of the billet did not automatically establish his position. Osterhaus, not wishing to increase the number of officers on his staff, had objected strenuously to the creation of the new billet. To overcome his objections the Bureau of Navigation concurred in his suggestion that the billet should be combined with the existing one of fleet tactical and athletic officer. All these functions were assigned Hooper. He was far from qualified as an athletic officer, and he found that duty time-consuming and so demanding that he could only perform his radio duties by working long hours each day.8


Hooper quickly became aware of the lack of supervision and discipline by personally observing the situation during many hours of monitoring the fleet circuit. The operators in the other ships, feeling secure from identification and being opposed to any officer supervision over a field which they had become accustomed to consider their very own, did everything possible in their endeavors to defeat him in his attempts to exercise supervision. After long hours of monitoring he could reasonably identify the various transmitters by their tones. He then explained the unsatisfactory situation to the Commander in Chief who authorized him to release a form message under his name to be addressed to the commanding officers of offending ships.9 When this message was received by an offending operator he was placed into a difficult position. Not only did he have to receive the message, but he also had time to think about his misdoings for some minutes before his commanding officer took summary action. The first operator who refused to acknowledge receipt of such a message was tried and convicted by court-martial. Information of this quickly reached the other operators, who took due notice. Slowly, but steadily, discipline was established and although there remained a few who would not accept the new order of things, most of the operators soon came to the realization that fleet communications were rapidly becoming more efficient.10


While all this was taking place, officers were being trained in operating and in procedures, for Hooper was well aware that no single individual could maintain discipline of the air. In spite of his objections to establishing the billet of fleet radio officer, within a few weeks of Hooper's reporting for duty and upon his recommendation, Osterhaus did order the commanding officers of all battleships, flagships of cruiser and gunboat divisions, and flotilla flagships of destroyers to designate an ensign as radio officer and to require him to become proficient in operating and in procedure and after a specified date to take the afternoon radio watch. Other ships were directed to assign radio duties to an officer as additional duty but they were not required to become operators. Many of these young officers became quite proficient and interested and became the nucleus of a group which would later do much to improve naval communications.11


Static was blamed for many things, it being a fine excuse for a lazy or incapable operator and, up until the time when sufficient officer supervision became available, there was little that could be done because the commanding officers could not determine whether or not static had actually interfered. There appeared only one solution to this problem--the elimination of static as an excuse for nonreception of messages--so an official order was issued and posted in all radio rooms, "Henceforth static disturbance will not be considered as an excuse for nonreception of a message." As would be expected, this became shorted to, "Henceforth there shall be no static," and Hooper found himself on the receiving end of considerable joshing. This order achieved the desired result, for the operators did become proficient in differentiating signal from static, even when the latter was almost enough to completely drown out the former.12
    Another effort more calculated to improve operators' capabilities was the institution, in 1912, of competition between them with promotions as prizes. This proved so valuable that an expanded version was later made a specific part in determining a ship's battle efficiency.13
    Additional stress was laid upon paralleling visual signals by radio, and some progress was made in the simultaneous use of several frequencies for tactical purposes. In a directive of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Commander in Chief was encouraged to use any of the standard frequencies "A" through "Z" for tactical purposes with the exception of "F", "G", "H" and "J."14 However, Osterhaus would not permit his ships to be maneuvered by radio and would only execute his signals by flaghoist.15


In 1913 Rear Adm. Charles J. Badger, USN, became Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The new Chief of Staff was Comdr. Charles F. Hughes, USN. Hughes had been thoroughly briefed at the Navy Department concerning the unsatisfactory radio situation which existed within the fleet and of the necessity for improvement. At his suggestion Badger relieved Hooper of his additional duties as fleet tactical and athletic officer and gave full support of his plans.16
    Discipline improved rapidly and a rivalry began between the signalmen and the radiomen with each group determined to obtain the acknowledgements of signals first. This materially improved the efficiency of both methods of signaling and created a healthy communications attitude.17
    After observing conditions for a period, Admiral Badger decided that he would exercise the battleship divisions for an entire day by radio signals alone, except that visual signals could be used in an emergency. This was conducted successfully without a single mishap or failure in communications.18
    It was fortunate that this exercise was held, for within the week a situation developed which necessitated maneuvering solely by radio signals. Sixteen battleships were about to proceed from Hampton Roads to Annapolis Roads. Just after the signal to get underway had been executed a terrific Chesapeake Bay squall descended accompanied by a howling wind. The visibility was reduced to zero and the situation became critical. Admiral Badger dared not let them anchor again as the current could have swept them into each other. Hesitating only for seconds to ascertain if all ships had their radio manned, he directed his signal transmitted by radio. It was quickly acknowledged by all but the U.S.S. New Jersey. Hooper, quite sure that the New Jersey had suffered a remote transmitter keying line casualty, advised the admiral that he believed she had received the signal, whereupon the latter ordered it executed. The storm continued for half an hour during which time all course and speed changes necessary to lead the fleet through the narrow dredged channel were given and executed by radio with only the New Jersey unable to acknowledge. When the storm passed all the ships were in position astern of the flagship. Badger, relieved of his anxiety, directed that thereafter both radio and visual methods would be used for tactical signaling, and that they would be executed by whichever method was the faster.19


As has been previously stated, the Bureau of Navigation did not consider it necessary to establish a new division when it became responsible for the operations and administration of the Naval Radio Service following the reorganization of the Navy Department effective 1 July 1910. This opinion was quickly changed following the enactment of legislation regulating radio communications, effective 13 December 1912. This law required that certain naval shore radio stations be opened to commercial business on that date, and that charges be made for handling this traffic with the monies derived therefrom to be turned into the U.S. Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. In view of the increased workload and responsibilities resulting from the legislation and the growing importance of intrafleet and ship-shore communications, the Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment of the Office of Superintendent of the Naval Radio Service under the Bureau of Navigation, with headquarters at Radio (Arlington), Virginia, by General Order 240, dated 9 November 1912.20
    Among other things, the Superintendent was charged with:
The preparation of regulations and issue of detailed instructions for the operation of stations in accordance with military efficiency, international agreements in force, and the laws effecting the operation of naval radio stations.
    Control of the commercial work handled by naval radio stations, including issue of accounting and operating forms, auditing commercial accounts, traffic agreements, and accounting with commercial and other government managements involved.
He was also charged with all matters pertaining to the operation of radio afloat and ashore, excepting technical control which remained with the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and was authorized to correspond directly within the naval service in regard to all matters on which he was authorized to take action in accordance with the procedure established for bureau and other offices of the Navy Department. He was also empowered to deal directly with private and commercial interests upon matters of reciprocal concern in the operation of naval radio stations, including questions of interference, and details of traffic agreements, rates, and accounting.21 Unfortunately, he was not made responsible for devising and issuing codes and ciphers at this time.
    The military control; inspection, and maintenance was vested in the commandants of the several naval stations, subject to Navy regulations, general orders, and instructions issued by the Superintendent, Naval Radio Service.


Captain W. H. G. Bullard,22 USN, was appointed Superintendent of the Naval Radio Service on 13 December 1912.
    In organizing his office, Bullard separated the Government and the commercial work, delegating the responsibility of the first to the Assistant Superintendent, Naval Radio Service, and the latter to the Head of the Commercial Department. The shore stations were divided by geographical considerations into three areas, Atlantic, Pacific, and Philippines. Each of the shore stations was placed under an area superintendent who reported directly to the Assistant Superintendent, Naval Radio Service, who was, additionally, the Atlantic Superintendent of Radio.


Thus, the end of 1912 found naval radio communications well and completely organized for the first time. Management and operational control was vested in the ComNavigation and delegated to the Superintendent of the Naval Radio Service; fleet operational control was vested in the Commander in Chief, subject to the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and represented in the person of the Fleet Radio Officer; military command of the shore stations was under the commandants of the several naval stations, and in the fleet under the chain of command; technical control of all radio equipment, including research, improvement, design, and construction, remained under the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering who delegated his responsibility to the Head of the Radio Division.
    This organization was definitely different in comparison with that in the Army where total responsibility was vested in a Chief Signal Officer responsible only to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. In the Navy it was a team under the guidance of the Superintendent of the Naval Radio Service with all members having definite responsibilities and authorities in the fields of endeavor in which best qualified. It was an organization constituted to cope with the stupendous task which confronted it and, although there would be many differences concerning the various solutions of the problems, no single individual could dictate since the organization provided a system of balances similar to that which has always existed in our Federal Government.


On April 21, 1914, after a year of strained relations with the revolutionary government of Mexico, President Wilson ordered the Navy to land troops, seize, and occupy the city of Veracruz. This occupation, which continued until November of the same year, was the proving ground of naval communications and pinpointed the deficiencies in our system.
    The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, aided by Hooper, had instituted many reforms within the fleet which tended to enhance the tactical and strategic value of radio. Despite these improvements, the system was far from capable of providing the communication services required by a major war.
    Radio, Virginia, had been established and equipped with the 100-kw. rotary spark gap and the 35-kw. arc transmitters in the endeavor to provide communication from the seat of government to fleet commanders distant from the U.S. mainland. These both failed to provide continuous direct radio communication between Washington and the ships at Veracruz, nor was such communication possible via Key West, Fla., the closest of the shore stations. Even had this station been successful, shipboard transmitters were of insufficient power to provide two-way communications. This necessitated stationing the U.S.S. Birmingham off Tampico, Mexico, to serve as a relay station between Key West and the U.S.S. Wyoming.23
    With the Birmingham at Tampico, satisfactory day and night communications could be maintained provided the men-of-war of other nations, stationed off Veracruz and Tampico for the protection of their nationals, abstained from transmitting when either Key West or the Birmingham was sending. The spark transmitters fitted on the foreign men-of-war created totally disruptive local interferences.24
    This situation necessitated the development of a time-sharing plan which was readily approved and adopted by the naval commanders of other nations present. Normally ships of three or four other nations were present and, under this plan, the United States was allotted a 2-hour period and the four other powers present 1 hour each. This resulted in there being periods of 4 or more hours when it was impossible to communicate between the Navy Department and its commander in the field. Although this condition could not be accepted during a major conflict, under the existing conditions a more satisfactory method could not have been devised.25
    Mr. Arthur O'Brien, at that time a radioman in the Birmingham, years later related an incident which indicated the excellent state of training and capabilities of the operators on the Wyoming and Birmingham. This proficiency was the result of Hooper's personal supervision and was not generally the condition existing throughout the service. He stated that in one 2-hour schedule, plus an additional minute of encroachment on another country's time, he transmitted 9 messages totalling 3,800 code groups, at a speed better than 31 groups per minute, all of which were correctly received by the operator in the Wycoming without request for repetition. In contrast with this, the English, French, and German operators, transmitted at the rate of 12 code groups per minute, and repeated each group regardless of existing conditions, thus reducing their traffic handling capability to 6 groups per minute. Under the prevailing division of time it would have required 4 days for them to have handled 3,800 code groups.26 This was just 2 months prior to the outbreak of World War I.
    The Veracruz occupation was not without its humorous events, one of which occurred on the day the city was occupied. A Mexican gunboat, totally unaware of events, was steaming up the coast with several hundred reinforcements for the garrison at Veracruz. Long before it hove into sight it commenced to call the commercial shore radio station at that port. Because of the interference from the ships in the harbor the shore station was unable to hear the call and at the same time the continuous effort was interfering with the reception of messages by the ships. Finally, the fleet radio officer contacted the vessel and offered to relay the message. This offer was gratefully and courteously accepted. Hooper, on receiving it for relay, expecting it would be military in character, found it to be a message from the captain of the gunboat to his wife stating that he would be home for dinner. One can further imagine his chagrin when, on arriving at Veracruz, his ship was immediately taken into custody.27
    Another humorous incident which occurred at the time was occasioned by the press representatives whose only means of forwarding items to their papers was by naval radio. Under the existing condition of time-sharing it was necessary to limit the number of words these representatives could file with the flagship. Additionally, these press items were subjected to delays since they could not take precedence over official messages and at times were several days in reaching their papers. Consequently, a delegation of newsmen prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to direct Badger to have the press items transmitted direct to New York without relay. Compliance with this directive was simple enough but it produced no faster press since the radio station at New York was unable to receive the flagship's transmissions. The relay stations, although the press messages were addressed to New York without relay instructions, simply copied the messages and forwarded them on to their destination.28


In addition to the failure to establish direct communications between Washington and the Atlantic Fleet flagship at Veracruz, the lack of secure means of communication quickly became apparent. Our Navy was slow in recognizing the requirements for a system to securely transmit orders and information by radio. This may have been the result of the early disregard and disinterest of many of its officers in this mode of communication. The "General Signal Book" of the United States Navy, 1908, was a revision of a publication of the same title which had previously been revised in 1898. It consisted of three books; the "General Signal Book," the "Tactical Signal Book," and the "Pocket Manual of Boat Signals." The "General Signal Book" included a telegraphic dictionary containing a syllabary of letters and syllables and a list of words and phrases numbered in a separate series, e.g.,
8856 . . . Smuggle, ed, ing, s
  344 . . . Hydro
It further provided ". . . in connection with the Signal Code a Navy list of officers will be used, consisting of the names in the Annual Navy Register of the latest issue, each one of which bears a number for this purpose." Some security was provided by restricting the use of the telegraphic dictionary section to commissioned officers.29
    In August 1912, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, issued an unclassified, nonregistered Radio Cipher "C", Atlantic Fleet. The letter of promulgation stated " . . . The code is divided into the following groups of signals to facilitate encoding and decoding.
First    Scouting Signals . . . Represented by 5-letter words.
Second    Letters, numerals and date signals . . . Represented by 3 and 4-letter words.
Third    Course and bearing signals . . . Represented by 4-letter words.
Fourth    A method of reporting latitude and longitude.
Fifth    A method of transposition of letters for sending messages not contained in the code.
Sixth    Call letters and code words for each portion of the force.".
The code was considered versatile and provided for encodement either by numeral or letter groups or by the sequential number of the signal in its particular section. The cipher was of the transposition type, varied by the use of key words.30
    On 12 May 1913, the Navy Department issued the "Battle Signal Book of the United States Navy, 1913." This was published as a "strictly confidential" registered publication. The letter of promulgation, signed by Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, stated, "The most important function of this code is that of a secret radio code for tactical and battle orders." It followed the same format as the "General Signal Book" and was in three parts, "General Signal Book"; "Battle Signal Book," and "Deck and Boat Book." The "General Signal Book" included a section of vocabulary signals, " . . . a syllabary of letters, syllables, and words which may be used to form sentences which are not found among the general signals. It forms a good secret radio code for messages other than tactical orders requiring instant simultaneous execution, and will be of use as such and for telegraphic and cable messages much more often than for transmission by hoists of flags. The signals include geographical names and the names of all ships in the Navy."31
    The "General Signal. Book" was again revised and reissued on 22 October 1913. This issue followed the same format as that of 1908. Physical security and accountability were provided by limiting issue to officers only. For the first time this publication provided for encipherment of the code.32
    In order to provide a code for training and privacy purposes, "The Service Radio Code of the United States Navy, 1914" was issued 10 February 1914. The letter of promulgation stated that it was " . . . issued for the purpose of furnishing a code, which being accessible to radio operators will be in frequent use, thus supplying desirable practice in the handling of code messages. This code was composed of four letter words each having a numerical equivalent, e.g.,
1658   CWYE   Barricade, ing, s.
    Messages encoded in this system were prefixed by the word "radiocode."33
    Despite these efforts, the Mexican incident caught the Navy Department totally unprepared to send secure communications. Messages, of which a more capable foe would have taken instant advantage, began to fill the air. Badger requested the Department to at least encode the vital and revealing portions of these and directed fleet units to encode all traffic. The request to the Department resulted in some slight improvement but not enough to deny information even to the most naive. The fleet auxiliary units were manned by merchant marine masters and crews who had had no training in communication security. In one instance one of our auxiliaries was anchored off Port Mexico at a time when the British Consul at the port desired to impart some information to the senior British naval officer at Veracruz. He requested the master of the auxiliary to transmit the message of about 200 words to the Wyoming for further delivery. The latter agreed to do so, but prior to the transmission he had it encoded verbatim, thereby presenting the British with about 200 groups of our relatively concise code.34


Following the short-lived activity, fleet units remained in Veracruz to support the occupation. This period was used in improving our communication security and in drilling in the use of additional frequencies.35 In August the Carranza forces entered Mexico City and virtually ended the Mexican incident.
    At this time events in Europe had become critical. On 28 July, Austria precipitated World War I by declaring war on Serbia. Within a week the Triple Entente was at war with the Triple Alliance. Early in the morning of 4 August the German men-of-war in Mexican waters, notified of Great Britain's entrance into the conflict by a prearranged and apparently innocuous commercial message, weighed anchor and proceeded to sea. The British and French commanders did not receive notification until late afternoon of the same day. They sailed that evening in pursuit of the German squadron.36 By the time they were overtaken they had rounded Cape Horn and joined up with the German Pacific squadron. This augmented squadron defeated the Allies at the Battle of Coronel.
    Shortly after this, Hooper was ordered to Europe as an observer of radio and communication in the European war zone. He was relieved by Lt. W. R. Furlong, USN, who had recently completed a postgraduate course in radio at Harvard University.37


The Radio Division of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, under the capable leadership of Hepburn, had made considerable improvement of equipment. The transmitters at all our shore stations and on the more important men-of-war had been equipped with either Telefunken, Chaffee, or Lowenstein quenched-spark or Fessenden rotary-spark gaps, all of which improved tonal quality and created less interference. These improvements made it possible to transmit simultaneously on several frequencies in the same area provided transmitter power was kept sufficiently low. Many of the transmitters had "jury-rig" quick frequency changers, but these were of little value when operating in areas where the men-of-war of other nationals were equipped with open-spark gaps and were using full power. A decision had been reached to change to the continuous wave method of transmission, employing the Poulsen arc transmitter, and 10 30-kw. sets were under contract for fitting into the newer battleships. The ships which were to receive such transmissions required fitting with either heterodyne or a "tikker" receivers. This was, of necessity and economy, a long-range plan. Fortunately, by 1912 the oscillating properties of the three-element vacuum tube had been realized, and it could be used to generate the local oscillations required by the heterodyne method.38
    Radio had "become of age" in the Navy but, as proved at Veracruz, it was far from maturity. Fortunately, the personnel involved were completely aware of this. There were many serious and pressing problems which required resolution among which were: increasing our ability to communicate by radio across the continent, with all our insular possessions, and with the fleet regardless of its area of operations; coping with interference; preventing an enemy from intercepting our signals or messages and turning this information to his advantage; increasing our own ability to interfere with or intercept the enemy's transmissions; devising a scheme of changing tactical calls when a ship shifted from one tactical position to another; increasing the ability to use several frequencies in the same area simultaneously; devising a means of shifting transmitter frequency quickly; reducing the vulnerability of radio equipment by installation below deck and behind armor; adopting a single telegraphic code for naval usage; developing secure code and cipher systems; developing direction-finding equipment in order to increase safety of navigation and for locating the sources of enemy transmissions; developing standard procedures for all types of signals and messages; pushing the development of aircraft radio; and, last but most important, to overcome the antagonism to radio which remained with many officers by forcing an appreciation by successful application, yet at the same time keeping the necessary balance between it and other types of communication. The solutions of these problems was necessary before the Navy could be provided with the communication system it would require in war.
Figure 15-1

    1 Letter, dated 2 Jan. 1911, W. F. Fullam to R. D. White, Flag Lieutenant, Atlantic Fleet. Naval War College, Archives, Newport, R.I. Fullam while Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy, during 1914-15, with a broad perspective of the educational requirements and of training of naval officers, broadened the course of instruction of the Academy.
    2 S. C. Hooper, "Navy History--Radio, Radar, Sonar," transcript of recordings, Office of Naval History, Washington, D.C., pp. 37-38.
    3 Enclosure to letter, dated 29 May 1939 C. H. Maddox to George H. Clark, entitled "Memorandum for Mr. G. H. Clark, RCA, New York", pp. 2-3.
    4 Enclosure to letter dated 7 Oct. 1911, Secretary of the Navy (Division of Operations) to Bureau of Steam Engineering, "being a report of wireless tests held in the Fleet in accordance with the instructions contained in the 'Rules for Autumn Practice 1911'."
    5 Hooper, op. cit., p. 35.
    6 Ibid., p. 36.
    7 Maddox, op. cit., "Memorandum for G. H. Clark, RCA, New York," pp. 3-4.
    8 Hooper, op. cit., p. 47.
    9 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
    10 Ibid., p. 40.
    11 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
    12 "Radioana," G. H. Clark, "Radio in War and Peace", Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., p. 134.
    13 Ibid., p. 135.
    14 Letter, dated 21 Oct. 1912, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering to Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, files, Bureau of Steam Engineering, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
    15 Hooper, op. cit., p. 50.
    16 Ibid., p. 51.
    17 Ibid., p. 52.
    18 Ibid., p. 54.
    19 Ibid., p. 57.
    20 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1913, (Washington Government Printing Office, 1913.), p. 124.
    21 W. H. G. Bullard, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1912, "United States Naval Radio Service", p. 450.
    22 Bullard was born in Media, Pa., on 6 December 1866. He was appointed a naval cadet from that State in 1882 and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1886. In 1907 he was ordered to the Naval Academy to organize, and become the Head of the Naval Academy's Department of Electrical Engineering. He served in this capacity for over 4 years and prepared the textbooks on this subject which were used by midshipmen for many years. When the Naval Radio Service was reorganized into the Naval Communications Service in 1915 he became its first Director. Upon completing this tour of duty he served at sea until early in 1919 when he again became Director, Naval Communications in which post, he served until he retired on 30 September 1922. During this period he was instrumental in encouraging the General Electric Co. to form the Radio Corp. of America. He was appointed chairman of the Federal Radio Commission in 1926, and while serving in this capacity he died on 24 November 1927.
    23 "Radioana," op. cit., Clark, "Radio in War and Peace."
    24 Ibid.
    25 Ibid.
    26 Hooper, op. cit., 11R.
    27 Ibid., 39R95.
    28 Ibid.
    29 Information from the Archives of the Registered Publication Section, Office of the Director, Naval Communications. Letter, dated 29 Dec. 1957, from Director, Naval Communications.
    30 Ibid.
    31 Ibid.
    32 Ibid.
    33 Ibid.
    34 Hooper, op. cit.
    35 Ibid., 11R.
    36 Ibid., 43R102-103.
    37 Ibid., 43R104.
    38 Ibid., 44R105.
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